INTRODUCTION
For organizations and individuals all future signs point to that every laptop, handheld device, and also desktop PC is connected wirelessly to the corporate network. Wireless connectivity gives the users access to data anywhere and anytime. Today, most of the enterprises are deploying wireless infrasaucture based on the IEEE 802.1 I standard [E], which offers access to enterprise intranet or Intemet data services.
Wireless network access technology raise new concerns when it comes to security and those who manage the wireless network must ensure that new vulnerabilities are not introduced to the corporate network. New challenges arrive when it comes to secure the wireless network and protect it against possible security threats like unauthorized use of the network. However, this threat is also present in traditional LANs, but wireless LANs have significantly concems caused by uncontrollable signal propagation. This means that potential intruders do not need to he physically located within an enterprise area.
in this paper, a new identity authentication protocol is proposed to detect unauthorized access in 802.1 1, called SOLA ~ (Statistical One-bit Lightweight Authentication). SOLA is a new option for access control with less identity authentication overhead than in traditional packet authentication mechanism. This is notable since wireless networks have limited handwidth resources and the challenge for wireless networks is to he both secure and lightweight in bandwidth consumption. be able to gain access to the network. Cheap: by presenting an optimized one-hit identity authentication method for resource-constrained environments like wireless networks, a cheap and efficient access control procedure is obtained. Robust: due to lossy channels in wireless communications a synchronization algorithm is required for the generated random authentication streams in the STA and the AP.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I1 describes the 802.1 1 access control mechanisms. Section I11 outlines the related work. In section IV the proposed solution is introduced in an overview and detailed description. Section V gives an evaluation with simulation results of the SOLA protocol and, finally, section VI concludes the paper.
11. THE IEEE 802.1 I ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS .
This section specifies three basic methods of securing access to the wireless APs in IEEE 802.11. They are the Wired Equivalent Privacy, Media Access Control Address filtering, and Service Set Identifier. Some of the weaknesses are also described in these access control mechanisms.
A . Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
WEP is specified for encryption and authentication between the STA and the AP and is based on the RC4 encryption algorithm. The 802.11 standard describe two types of authentication services. It is the Open Sysfem Aulhenlicalion and the Shared Key Authentication.
The 802.1 I does not provide a per packet authentication, only encryption using WEP. Thus, packet authentication is optional. However, a series of theoretical and practical attacks against WEP have been published [IO, 31. 0-7803-7632-31OZS17.00 02002 IEEE
B. Media Access Control Address Filtering
Each AP can be configured with a list of MAC addresses that are allowed access to the AP, and the MAC address is associated with a STA. If the STA's MAC address is not in the AP's access list, the AP will deny access. This is a practical security solution if the network is small since the work of manually updating lists of all the MAC addresses Limits the scalability of this approach. Unfortunately, MAC addresses are easily sniffed by an eavesdropper since they appear in the clear even when the functionality of WEP is enabled. Also, most of the wireless cards provide the 'service' of changing the MAC address via software, which makes it very easy to spoof a valid MAC address.
C. Service Set ldenf@er (SSID)
The SSID allows a network to be divided into multiple networks. In order to be able to access any of these networks, the STA must be configured with the correct SSID identifier.
Several management frames contain the SSID identifier, and are broadcasted in the clear by AP or STA. This causes, however, a vulnerability to the network since an attacker can easily sniff the SSID and use it in order to gain access to the protected network. Therefore, there is need for a secure lightweight packet identity authentication mechanism. , and RFC 241 1 [9] . In IPSec, the total length of an Authentication Header is 24 bytes (192 bits). If attached to every packet the Authentication Header constitutes a relatively big load of bits over the radio l i k as compared to the one-bit SOLA protocol, even though SOLA provides identity authentication at the MAC layer.
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IV. CONTRIBUTION
This section demonstrates SOLA, the proposed identity authentication protocol for access control in 802.11. A brief overview is given followed by a more detailed description of the implementation.
A. SOLA Overview
By introducing SOLA one will get a robust lightweight one-bit identity authentication protocol without the need for expensive authentication mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, VPNs are used lo provide protection for areas where current 802.1 1 solutions are weak. Unless some strong authentication mechanisms (such as IPSec AHESP, WEP or AES+OCB in IEEE 802.11 Task Group I, all of which are somewhat expensive) are used to protect the "data packets", we have no assurance generally about whether some "malicious" neighbors are impersonating a non-malicious user. On the other band, if strong authentication is used between the STA and the AP, the user's data packets might be authenticated (unnecessarily) twice: one time between STA and AP, and second between STA and CH (Correspondent Host), as shown in Fig I. The combined solution of WEP and IPSec is a drawback in a constrained wireless environment since both WEP and IPSec are used simultaneously over the radio link.
However, it is most common that an IPSecNPN tunnel is used to protect the traffic without any encryption or authentication at the link layer. Therefore, to still be able to ohtain access control, a new option is presented at the link layer for per packet identity authentication. Unlike a traditional packet verification mechanism, the decision is made on per packet basis, SOLA determines legitimacy of a series of packets. Ideally, since the attacker does not have the right key, the probability for the attacker to guess continuously n bits correctly is as small as 2.". With the SOLA algorithm there is only one bit for identity authentication, which greatly reduces bandwidth overhead and thus preserves the scarce wireless bandwidth resource without compromising security. An attacker cannot steal service or launch attack with fake addresses by bypassing identity authentication without being detected.
Both the STA and the AP will have a module called the Authentication Stream Generator (ASG), which will generate a particular random bit stream. Only one bit is added to each transmitted packet from the STA to the AP for the outbound traffic. Normally, without any packet loss or security attacks, each bit will be used once, and a new bit will be used for each new packet.
The 802.11 standard only offers a weak one-way authentication, The trust assukption that is reflected from this design is that the A P s are trusted devices, which might be a misjudgment. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the SOLA protocol should be used in a bi-directional way.
SOLA offers the following nice properties: Originator Sender Identity Authenlication: If the authentication bit is verified correctly, the receiver has a statistical assurance that the packet originated from the claimed sender. This also includes data freshness and replay protection.
each packet for identity authentication.
Low Communicafion Overhead Only one bit is added to
B . SOLA Implementofion
Due to the nature of wireless communication with unreliable communication links, the implementation of the SOLA protocol is a major challenge. Therefore, the bit stream synchronization between the AP and the STA is critical because, in a wireless and insecure network environment, packets might get lost or tampered unintentionally or even intentionally. Bits can also become corrupted because of noise. SOLA introduces a synchronization algorithm to handle the wireless lossy environment. Thus, one of the goals is to provide a secure and robust solution.
The SOLA protocol has multiple phases and will be described with the following key words: ASG, packet format, and synchronization algorithm.
ASG: Technically, any secure random bit generator can be used as an Authentication Stream Generator. The purpose is to generate an authentication stream that cannot be guessed by an attacker. In the design it is assumed that the STA and the AP will share a session key provided from the connection setup. Based on this session key the random authentication stream is generated from the ASG. A practicable implementation of the ASG, which is used in our simulations, is to apply a device similar to the encryption engine in the Bluetooth specification [2].
Packet Format: One important issue in SOLA is about where in the packet to insert this new identification bit. It can be in either MAC or IP, header, and it really depends on the standardization groups such as IEEE or IETF to make the final decision. In tbe following description, it is assumed that it is embedded in the IEEE 802.1 1 MAC header.
The 802.11 standard [I] specifies an overall MAC packet format. The one hit for identity authentication will be inserted in the data packet and the "failed" or "success" bit, from the AP to the STA, will be inserted in the response acknowledgement packet. In the simulations we are currently using the most significant bit in the sequence control field for the data packet and the most significant bit in the duration field for the ACK packet.
Synchronization Algorithm: Conceptually, both the STA and the AP has a pointer pointing to the hit for the next outgoing packet. Ideally, both the STA and the AP will have their pointers pointing at exactly the same bit and advance synchronously. However, due to packet loss and other failures or noise, it is almost certain that the bit pointers between the STA and the AP not will be synchronized. We then weaken the synchronous condition a little: STA's bit pointer must be equal with or hebind the pointer of AP in bit advancing (i.e., continue to the next bit in the random authentication stream).
In the analysis and fault tolerance section, we show how to guarantee this condition to be true in the protocol, and how to re-synchronize once the STA is indeed behind the AP.
A M this section describes the analysis part of the synchronization algorithm. Lemma 1.1. If the STA advances regularly then the AP must have advanced. Since the STA will not advance unless it receives the acknowledge (ACK) packet together with the result of the verification of the authentication bit, i.e., "failed or "success". Lemma 1.2. If the STA advances to the next opposite bit (the opposite bit is the next bit in the authentication stream with an opposite value of the current bit), it will not advance more than the AP. ]. Any loss of a packet will result in a less than or equal to j3. But the next packet will be "failed" by the AP while the STA can re-transmit. If packet is "failed", the AP will increase p to opposite bit + 1. If the STA did not receive the AP's ACK packet it wil!.use the same bit Bitla] for the retransmission and it will not advance (i.e., increase the value of a). Eventually, it should receive an ACK packet from the AP and find out about the failure and also increase a to opposite bit + 1. In any case, it is safer to stay at the same bit unless the STA heard the ACK message from the AP. The synchronization algorithms explained above can partially be described with the following pseudo code:
Algorithm for AP 1. 
. if B i t I o l
End Of Algorithm
The IEEE 802.11 MAC header contains a sequence number (also a fragment nuinher). However, this sequence number is not possible to use for synchronization. The reason is that the hits in the authentication stream must advance regularly to the next bit in the identity authentication stream. In the case of retransmission of packets the sequence number in the IEEE 802.11 MAC header remains constant, and will not contribute to any advancement in the identity authentication stream.
A concem is if the authentication bit is corrupted by noise.
This could result in the fact that the STA's bit pointer is not equal with or behind the pointer of AP in bit advancing. To solve this problem four different solutions are proposed:
Rely on the 4 bytes Frame Check Sequence (FCS) in the 802.1 I standard to check for transmission errnrs in the packet. Apply the proposed synchronization algorithm but achieve redundancy by placing the one-bit in different locations of the packet. The receiving station now has higher probability to decide the value of the received bit. Apply the proposed synchronization algorithm but divide the authentication stream into window segment of length N . Then allocate log,N bits in the packet for bit positioning of the bit-pointer in the window. For instance, if N is equal to 8 we need 3 bits in the packet for hit positioning of the bit pointer. In the extreme case when the two authentication streams cannot be synchronized one have to re-negotiate a new session key and compute new identity authentication streams. The decision of re-negotiation could be based on factors like the number of incorrect identity authentication bits due to packet loss, synchronization performance, or an attack.
V. EVALUATION
This section discusses the synchronization algorithm evaluation and the security evaluation. All the simulations have been implemented under the ns-2 environment. The simulations have been carefully chosen to be realistic in order to illustrate the behavior and performance of the SOLA protocol. In the simulations a session is established between two mobile devices with TCP data sources and an FTP application on top for traffic generation. To simulate an ASG, a device similar to the encryption engine in the Bluetooth specification [2] is implemented. Furthermore, the MAC protocol used in the simulations is IEEE 802.1 I.
A. Synchronization Algorithm Evalualion
The performance of the synchronization algorithm 1s evaluated in terms of failure rate, duration, and drop probability for acknowledgement (ACK) packet only. The number of failed packets (packets in which the identification hit is wrong) is recorded and summed up. Then, the failure rate is derived by the ratio between the total number of "failes' packets and the total number of "checked" packets. The duration is the value of the successive numbers of dropped acknowledgement packets. That is if one drops an acknowledgement packet the coming acknowledgement packets after that one will also be dropped, and the number of successive dropped packets depends on the duration value.
By increasing the duration value one will stress the synchronization algorithm. In the simulations the duration value differs from 1 to 6.
As shown in Fig 2, the synchronization algorithm resynchronizes without any problems, even when the duration and the dropping probability for the acknowledgement packets increase. The highest failure rate is 50 % and this is due to the randomness of the identification bit generated by the ASG. All this demonstrates that the algorithm has high robustness, which was one of the major goals in the design of the SOLA protocol. 
B. The Securiy Evaluation
While attacks on the network access might not occur very often, it is necessary to have a framework to detect and respond to this problem when it does happen. However, the SOLA protocol major purpose is to detect an attack, and it offers a statistical way to "identify" the origin of the packets for the purpose of access control. In this section, faulthtrusion detection and response is discussed for four possible attacks: Denial-ofservice attack, overwrite attack, Man-in-Middle attack, and guessing the identi@ authentication bit attack.
A Denial-of-Service attack from an adversary could, for instance, be launched by the transmission of "failed" acknowledgement packet even if the data packet with corresponding identity hit was correctly received. The goal for the attacker is to cormpt the identity authentication bit synchronization between the STA and the AF'. This type of attack is easy to detect by the nature of the SOLA protocol since the failure rate will increase to an ahnormal value. The faulthntrusion detection and response to this attack would be to set a failure rate threshold, and if a user's profile does exceed the threshold then try to re-establish its connection to make sure that the shared key is synchronized. If this will not help, then one should suspect an ongoing attack and if necessary hun on a less lightweight access control method like IPSec or locally investigate the source of the problem. Interesting is that hy only adding one bit to each packet it is possible to detect the Denial-of-Service attack of this kind, and then one might use a method (like IPSec) that requires more computational power to defend against the attack.
An "overwrite" attack is an attack in which the adversary "overwrites" the content in a packet with a very high power signal, something which we believe is very hard to do. In such an attack, the identity authentication hit remains the same but the payload or header contains new data. In this scenario the SOLA protocol do not detect the attack. If one believes that this attack is possible to obtain then IPSec could be used with the authentication option, and the end user will detect the malicious content in the payload or header. Similarly, an adversary who receives a packet with the identity authentication bit, and modifies the content and not the identity authentication bit in the payload or header field, could launch a Man-in-Middle attack. The goal of the adversary with these attacks could, for instance, he to steal bandwidth from another STA. If someone tries to steal the bandwidth, by a Man-in-Middle attack, the attacked STA will not advance in the identity authentication stream and send new TCP data packets due to the nature of the absence of TCP response packets. Therefore, a Man-+Middle attack of this kind would not succeed against the SOLA protocol.
A "guessing the identi@ authentication bit" attack is an attack in which an adversary tries to obtain access to the secure network by guessing the identity authentication bit for each successive packet. Also, in this case the SOLA protocol will detect the attack and, shown in Fig 2, an adversary who tries to guess the identity authentication hit will cause a failure rate of 50 % for all values of the acknowledgement packet drop probability. Similar to the Denial-of-Service attack, a threshold for the failure rate could be set in order to determine if it is an attack or not. This is done so as to he able to decide whether the failure rate of the authentication bit follows the normal packet loss behavior or not. In the case in which an adversary does not try to guess all successive packets but instead a few packets at the time, the failure rate will be less than 50 %. Therefore, a failure rate threshold with a lower value than 50 % needs to he set. The response of this statistical access control method from the AP would he not to grant access to the secure network.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a lightweight protocol for access control in IEEE 802.11 networks has been presented. The proposed SOLA protocol inserts an identity authentication bit from a stream lolawn only to the two communicating stations. Any secure random hit generator could generate the identity authentication bit. The challenge has been the synchronization between the two end points due to a lossy and shared wireless channel. Therefore, a synchronization algorithm has been given to handle packet loss apd simulation results were presented to evaluate the synchronization behavior and show the robustness of the algorithm. Finally, the SOLA protocol is well suited in a wireless constrained environment since the communication overhead for the protocol is low: only one bit. Furthermore, it is possible to develop a framework to detect, for instance, Denial-of-Service attacks or an adversary who hies to attack the secure and protected network by guessing the identity authentication bit for successive packets.
